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Abstract
We study the relation between liquidity in nancial markets and post-trading fees (i.e.
clearing and settlement fees). The clearing and settlement agent (CSD) faces di¤erent
marginal costs for di¤erent types of transactions. Costs are lower for an internalized
transaction, i.e. when buyer and seller originate from the same broker. We study two fee
structures that the CSD applies to cover its costs. The rst is a uniform fee on all trades
(internalized and non-internalized) such that the CSD breaks even on average. Traders
then maximize trading rates and higher post-trading fees increase observed liquidity in
the market. The second fee structure features a CSD breaking even by charging the
internalized and non-internalized trades their respective marginal cost. In this case,
traders face the following trade-o¤: address all possible counterparties at the expense of
considerable post-trading fees, or enjoy lower post-trading fees by targeting own-broker
counterparties only. This di¤erence in post-trading fees drives tradersstrategies and
thus liquidity. Furthermore, across the two fee structures, we nd that observed liquidity
may di¤er from cum-fee liquidity (which encompasses the post-trading fees). With
trade-specic fees, the cum-fee spread depends on the interacting counterparties. Next,
regulators can improve welfare by imposing a particular fee structure. The optimal fee
structure hinges on the magnitude of the post-trading costs. Noteworthy, a fee structure
yielding higher social welfare may in fact reduce observed liquidity. Finally, we consider
a number of extensions including market power for the CSD, anonymous trading and
di¤erences in broker size.
JEL Codes: G10, G15
Keywords: transaction fees, internalization, clearing and settlement, liquidity, anonymity
1 Introduction
Trading in nancial markets induces transaction costs (e.g. bid-ask spread, commissions,
trading platform fees and post-trading fees), which are of considerable importance. Data
from Elkins/McSherry, for example, show that explicit transaction costs constitute about
three quarters of total transaction costs (see e.g. Domowitz and Steil (2002)). Further,
according to a 2011 Oxera report, post-trading fees for European equities in 2009 are
of equal importance as trading platform fees. While implicit transaction costs such as
the bid-ask spread and market impact have been extensively studied in the nance lit-
erature1, the impact of these explicit transaction costs on the organization of trading
and market quality has largely been overlooked. Our paper makes a rst step to ll this
void by analyzing the impact of di¤erent post-trading fee schedules on market liquidity.
As such, we investigate how the pricing of back o¢ ce activities (i.e. post-trading fees)
inuences the front o¢ ce (i.e. the organization of trading and market quality). Overall,
our model features the trade-o¤between enhanced trading opportunities through access-
ing the broader market while facing considerable post-trading fees, or internalization of
trading with lower execution probability combined with reduced post-trading fees. Of
central importance throughout the analysis is the concept of settlement internaliza-
tion, which occurs when buyer and seller originate from the same broker or investment
rm.
Our research approach is motivated by a number of recent events at the trading
and the post-trading level. In the US, the Depositary Trust and Clearing Corporation
(DTCC) which clears and settles trades of all exchanges observed that an increasing
number of investment rms pre-netted their trades such that the order ow observed by
the DTCC was not representative for the entire market. One of the actions taken by the
DTCC was to reduce the post-trading fees for trades where buyer and seller originate
from the same broker or investment rm (i.e. where settlement can be internalized) in
order to reduce the economic incentive for using pre-netting (see e.g. DTCC (2003)).
In Europe, with the implementation of the Markets in Financial Instruments Directive
(MiFID), several regulated markets have introduced features allowing for settlement
internalization. The London Stock Exchange for example started its SETS Internalizer
in April 2007. This mechanism prevents on-book self-executions from passing through
to clearing and settlement, thus minimizing post-trading fees. As a result, all order
book executions where both sides of the trade originate from the same investment rm
do not pass through to clearing and settlement. The tari¤ charged is 0.1 bp, which is
87.5% lower than the headline rate.2 Similarly, Euronext has created an algorithm that
induces buy and sell orders originating from the same investment rm to avoid post-
1See Madhavan (2000) and Biais, Glosten and Spatt (2005) for a survey.
2See page 8 on http://www.londonstockexchange.com/traders-and-brokers/rules-
regulations/mid/pre-trade.pdf
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trading fees.3 Our paper addresses how settlement internalization and the associated fee
structure a¤ects liquidity during trading in the nancial market.
We model the trading phase as a limit order market. Each trader on this market is
linked to a broker which leads to two potential types of trades: internalized trades,
where buyer and seller originate from the same broker, and non-internalized trades,
where buyer and seller are a¢ liated to di¤erent brokers. In turn, the post-trading in-
frastructure is modeled as a clearing and settlement agent. Throughout the paper, this
entity is referred to as a Central Securities Depository (CSD), in line with the litera-
ture on clearing and settlement which is summarized later on in this introduction. We
compare the impact on market quality of two di¤erent fee structures implemented by
the CSD. Under the uniform fee structure the CSD aims to break even on average
by charging the same fee for both internalized and non-internalized trades. In contrast,
under the trade-specic fee structurethe CSD breaks even by charging each transac-
tion its individual marginal cost which implies internalized trades (which are easier to
handle) are cheaper as compared to non-internalized trades. When determining their
optimal order submission strategy traders take into account the (expected) post-trading
fees resulting from the reigning fee structure.
Our main insights can be summarized as follows. First, explicit transaction costs such
as post-trading fees a¤ect tradersoptimal order submission strategies, and thus liquidity
observed in nancial markets. In general, with uniform fees, traders always maximize the
probability of nding a counterparty as targeting own counterparties only does not allow
beneting from lower post-trading fees. Higher post-trading fees then increase observed
liquidity. The reasoning is that the resulting larger charged uniform post-trading fees
lead to more aggressive limit order pricing to induce incoming counterparties to trade.
This is in line with empirical evidence of Berkowitz, Logue and Noser (1988) who nd
that larger explicit costs decrease implicit transaction costs (be it non-commensurate).
A higher degree of internalization stemming from a more concentrated broker industry
reduces post-trading fees and observed liquidity. In turn, under the trade-specic fee
structure, traders face a trade-o¤ which hinges on the magnitude of the post-trading
costs. With low post-trading costs (and thus low charged post-trading fees) for non-
internalized trades, traders submit orders to maximize their probability of nding a
counterparty taking into account that they may incur these post-trading fees. The
trade-o¤ tilts towards targeting own counterparties only when the post-trading cost
(and thus the charged post-trading fee) for non-internalized trades becomes high or the
broker industry becomes concentrated. Traders then prefer a higher surplus in case of
execution (i.e. without post-trading fees as all trades are internalized) combined with a
lower probability of execution. This shows that trading rates in the market are inuenced
by post-trading costs, the fee structure and the concentration in the broker industry.
3See page 40 on http://www.nyse.com/pdfs/NYSE_Euronext_%20Analyst_Presentation.pdf
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Second, liquidity as observed in the market may di¤er from cum-fee liquidity (i.e. the
liquidity at which a market order trades after adding the post-trading fees). With
uniform fees, the cum-fee spread increases in post-trading fees. Interestingly, when the
CSD implements the trade-specic fee schedule, the cum-fee spread hinges on the match
between the two counterparties. The observed spread equals the cum-fee spread when
counterparties of the same broker meet. In contrast, for non-internalized trades both
buyer and seller incur the post-trading fee, implying the cum-fee spread is larger than
the observed spread. Third, regulators can improve market liquidity by imposing a fee
structure on the CSD. The liquidity-optimizing fee structure depends on the gains from
trading, the marginal costs for the CSD and the concentration in the broker industry.
Fourth, we perform a welfare analysis comparing the di¤erent settings employing an
overall welfare measure (thus capturing all market participants). For high post-trading
costs, the trade-specic fee structure maximizes welfare as it features only internalized
trades. Within this cost range, the uniform fee structure induces a higher trading rate
but also a large fraction of costly non-internalized trades. For intermediate levels of post-
trading costs, a uniform fee structure is preferred by the social planner as it maximizes
the trading rate and non-internalized trades contribute to welfare. In contrast, the trade-
specic fee structure would induce limit order traders to submit orders targeting own-
broker counterparties only. As a consequence, welfare-creating non-internalized trades
would not take place. For low levels of post-trading costs, both fee structures yield the
same welfare. Finally, our welfare results highlight an important trade-o¤ for the social
planner. For high post-trading costs, maximum observed liquidity is achieved under the
uniform fee structure. However, uniform fees produce lowest welfare in this range of
costs. In turn, for very low post-trading costs, while the uniform and trade-specic fee
structures yield the same welfare, observed liquidity is higher under the trade-specic fee
structure. As a consequence, a social planner potentially has to choose between liquidity
and social welfare when setting its regulation for a fee structure to be implemented by
the CSD: a fee structure implying higher market liquidity in fact may reduce social
welfare.
We also investigate a number of extensions to our model. First, we analyze a CSD
having pricing power in setting the fee for non-internalized trades. The CSD then
optimally sets this fee such that traders continue to maximize trading opportunities.
Our ndings indicate that observed liquidity increases compared to perfect competition
because counterparties need to be compensated for the higher post-trading fee. This
result further demonstrates that imperfect competition (market power) at the post-
trading phase has an e¤ect on liquidity during the trading phase. Overall welfare is
not a¤ected compared to the main model, but there is a redistribution from traders
to the CSD. In a second extension we assume an arriving trader cannot observe the
identity of the counterparty such that she cannot perfectly infer whether a trade would
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be internalized or not. In addition, we study an in-between setting where traders
can choose whether or not to reveal their identity. We show that quotes and observed
liquidity are di¤erent under each setting. Moreover, from a overall welfare perspective,
a social planner always prefers the in-between setting over the full anonymity and
the full transparency setting. In a third and last extension we allow brokers to be of
di¤erent size. When the CSD imposes trade-specic fees, bid and ask quotes of traders
then hinge upon their broker a¢ liation. As a result, traders from small brokers may
submit di¤erent quotes than traders from large brokers. Markets could then become
more or less liquid at points in time, depending on which group of traders (from the
large or small broker) is active at that point.
To our knowledge no papers exist linking the organization of the post-trading in-
frastructure to stock market liquidity. Taking a wider perspective, our paper is related
to di¤erent sets of literature.
First, it relates to the literature on order submission strategies in limit order markets
such as Foucault (1999), Parlour (1998), Handa, Schwartz and Tiwari (2003), Foucault,
Kadan and Kandel (2005), Goettler, Parlour and Rajan (2005), Roşu (2009) and Van
Achter (2009). These papers model how traders choose between market orders and
limit orders in di¤erent dynamic settings. We extend them by including the impact
of heterogeneity in post-trading fees on the optimal quote setting behavior of traders
linked to di¤erent brokers. Our paper also relates to the literature on make/take fees
as modeled in Foucault, Kadan and Kandel (2011) and Colliard and Foucault (2011),
and empirically analyzed in Malinova and Park (2011). In many markets, providers of
liquidity receive a make fee, whereas consumers of liquidity pay a take fee. Foucault,
Kadan and Kandel (2011) show this may induce liquidity cycles to arise, while Colliard
and Foucault (2011) analyze how inter-market competition a¤ects these make/take fees
and ultimately trader behavior and liquidity. Our paper contributes to this literature
by highlighting that outstanding quotes by one broker in the limit order book may
induce asymmetries for traders a¢ liated to di¤erent brokers. When the transaction is
internalized and implies no post-trading cost, the post-trading fee is low and it is as
if the payable take fee is small. In contrast, when a trader of another broker is the
counterparty, post-trading fees are high and it is as if the payable take fee is large.
As such, our model generates di¤erent trading rates (i.e. targeting all counterparties or
own-broker counterparties only) which stem from di¤erences in post-trading fees and not
from traders exhibiting di¤erent valuations for stocks and di¤erent degrees of impatience
(as in Colliard and Foucault (2011)).
Second, our work contributes to the literature on clearing and settlement. Existing
theoretical papers therein mostly deal with the optimal pricing strategies when central
securities depositories (CSDs) interact, in order to explain the high markups for cross-
border transfers of securities or the e¤ects of di¤erent degrees of access to the CSDs
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(see e.g. Rochet (2005), Tapking and Yang (2006), Holthausen and Tapking (2007),
Tapking (2007), and Koeppl, Monnet and Temzelides (2012)). We model how a cost-
based post-trading infrastructure may a¤ect liquidity in nancial markets in two di¤erent
ways. First, internalization of order ow reduces fees payable to the CSD and therefore
changes the tradersaggressiveness in the stock market. Second, the way a cost-based
fee structure is implemented by the CSD may lead to di¤erent stock market equilibria.
In particular, a pricing strategy fully reecting the CSDs marginal cost may lead to an
equilibrium where traders opt to only address counterparties from the same broker. This
reduces the total number of transactions and decreases liquidity. Further, the empirical
papers on the post-trading infrastructure mainly investigate whether there are economies
of scale and scope in the clearing and settlement industry (see e.g. Van Cayseele and
Wuyts (2008)). Our paper shows that on average transactions may exhibit di¤erent
degrees of di¢ culty (i.e. easier internalized clearing and settlement versus more di¢ cult
cross-broker clearing and settlement), hinging on the particular stock market equilibrium
that is played.
Third, a few papers connect di¤erent phases of the trading process. Foucault and
Parlour (2004) model how competition between stock exchanges links listing fees and
transaction costs on those exchanges. They nd that competing exchanges relax com-
petition by choosing di¤erent trading technologies and listing fees. Ellul and Pagano
(2006) link the IPO stage with trading in the after-market and show that IPO under-
pricing is larger when the after-market is expected to be less liquid. Our paper also links
two phases of the trading cycle, i.e. trading and post-trading.
The remainder of this paper is structured as follows. Section 2 introduces the setup
of our model. Section 3 presents two di¤erent fee structures implemented by the clearing
and settlement agent, and the corresponding equilibria. Within Section 4, these equilibria
are further analyzed and compared with respect to liquidity and trading rates, and a
welfare analysis is provided. Section 5 presents a number of extensions to our main
model. Finally, Section 6 concludes.
2 Setup
We develop an innite horizon model to analyze a continuous limit order market listing
a single security. Before trading starts, the clearing and settlement agent (from now on
denoted as CSD) sets the fees of clearing and settlement. Traders take these post-trading
fees as given during the subsequent trading game. Each period in time t = 0; 1; ::: +
1, a single trader arrives who is willing to trade one share of the asset. Traders are
risk neutral, aim to maximize expected utility, and exhibit an exogenously determined
trading orientation which makes them either a buyer or a seller. We assume that the
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likelihood of arrival of a buyer and a seller is identical.4 Buyers have a private valuation
for the asset equal to Vh, whereas sellers have a private valuation Vl. We assume both
valuations are non-negative and Vh   Vl > 0, which implies there are always gains from
trade between both parties in the absence of post-trading fees. These di¤erences in
valuation are an outcome of taxes, liquidity shocks, or other portfolio considerations
such as di¤erences in endowment, or in opinions on the expected value of the asset.5
Each trader is linked to one of N possible brokers which means their individual orders
are sent to the market through this particular broker. Brokers do not have any other role
in our model. We assume N  2 and that every broker has an equal share of a¢ liated
traders (in an extension developed in Subsection 5.3 we consider a setup with two brokers
where one broker is large and the other broker is small, allowing us to deal with brokers
of di¤erent sizes). As such, 1=N can also be interpreted as a measure of concentration
of the broker industry: the larger this fraction becomes, the more concentrated is the
broker industry. Broker a¢ liations are indexed by superscript j 2 f1; :::; Ng. Hence,
for a trader arriving in a random period t, with probability 1=(2N) it is or a buyer or
a seller from broker j. In our base case setting, we assume that transparency holds
such that broker a¢ liations are observable to traders (in an extension developed within
Subsection 5.2 we relax this assumption). Since N  2, two types of trades can then
occur: internalized trades and non-internalized trades. We dene internalized trades as
trades where both buyer and seller are a¢ liated to the same broker. Non-internalized
trades are then trades where buyer and seller stem from a di¤erent broker.
The CSD handles clearing and settlement immediately after each transaction, is risk
neutral and has no xed costs of operating. However, it has a marginal cost c per leg of
the trade for non-internalized trades (i.e. more complex trades involving di¤erent bro-
kers), and a lower marginal cost for internalized trades (i.e. trades involving the same
broker) which we normalize to zero. In implementing its fee structure, the CSD aims to
break even on average, but does not necessarily charge its true marginal cost on each
individual transaction. Overall, depending on the sophistication of the fee structure, a
CSD can charge di¤erent fees based on the type of transaction and thus di¤erentiate be-
tween internalized and non-internalized trades. To properly account for this distinction,
we consider two di¤erent fee structures: uniform and trade-specic. The uniform fee
structure means that the CSD charges the same fee to internalized and non-internalized
trades. Thus, the uniform fee is set such that the CSD breaks even on average. In turn,
the trade-specic fee structure entails a CSD breaking even by charging internalized and
non-internalized trades a fee equal to their respective individual marginal cost. Denote
4Our model is easily adjusted for the case where the likelihood of buyers and sellers arriving is
di¤erent from 0:5; however it becomes slightly more complex since buyers and sellers no longer choose
symmetric strategies. We prefer equal probabilities as this allows to more easily identify the impact of
di¤erent fee structures implemented by the clearing and settlement agent.
5See Du¢ e et al. (2005) for further economic interpretations.
6
the post-trading fee by ci, with superscript i 2 fI;NIg indicating the fee charged for
internalized (I) and non-internalized (NI) trades.6 The two di¤erent fee structures are
then summarized as follows:
Fee Structure CSD Uniform cI = cNI
Trade-Specic cI < cNI
Both fee structures and their respective equilibrium fees and impact on quotes will
be further analyzed in Section 3.
An arriving trader bases her order submission strategy on her observation of the
standing limit order book (LOB). She may have two possibilities at her disposal to
trade. On the one hand, she could post a quote by submitting a limit order (LO) which
does not o¤er certainty of execution. Posted LOs stay in the market for one period
and are thus take-or-leave o¤ers for the next trader (see Foucault (1999) for a similar
approach). On the other hand, she could submit a market order (MO) which guarantees
immediate execution but at a less favorable execution price. Liquidity-demanding MOs
execute against standing liquidity-supplying LOs, so they can only be submitted if a
counterparty LO is already present in the LOB. Clearly, the LOs execution probability
is endogenous in the model as it depends on other tradersorder placement strategies.
We will further discuss this issue at the end of this section. Orders are for one unit of
the asset, and once submitted cannot be modied or cancelled. New in our model and
a key contribution to the existing literature (such as Foucault (1999), Handa, Schwartz
and Tiwari (2003), Van Achter (2009), and Colliard and Foucault (2011)) is that traders
also account for the fee structure implemented by the CSD in choosing their optimal
strategy. More specically, conditional upon execution, the utility of trading the asset at
price P for a buyer equals Vh P   cI if the buyer and seller are of the same broker and
Vh   P   cNI if the buyer and seller are a¢ liated to a di¤erent broker. A sellers utility
is P   Vl   cIwhen seller and buyer stem from the same broker and P   Vl   cNI when
seller and buyer are of di¤erent brokers. Hence, as non-trading gains are normalized to
zero, the fee-adjusted reservation price that buyers are willing to pay and that sellers
are willing to receive for one share of the asset hinges on the traders broker a¢ liation,
the counterpartys broker a¢ liation and the implemented fee structure. Put di¤erently,
it is as if the transaction tax(i.e. the fee) on a particular trade hinges not only on
whether there is a trade but also on whether the counterpartys broker is identical to
the traders one or not. This inuences tradersstrategies.
Traders aim to maximize the expected payo¤ of their order and therefore also need
to account for its execution probability. In setting the optimal bid or ask quotes when
submitting a LO, a trader in general has two possibilities. She could determine quotes
6We do not make a distinction between di¤erent fees for di¤erent brokers as brokers are identical in
our setup.
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that only attract counterparties from her own broker (we label this strategy own) or
she can opt for a quote that is attractive to all possible counterparties, i.e. traders from
her own broker and from all other brokers (we label this strategy all). Do note that
attractin this context means the targeted incoming trader is at least willing to hit the
standing LO by submitting a MO. Thus, any trader submitting a LO needs to account
for the MO strategy of the subsequently arriving trader.7 Given that traders are linked
to a broker j two possible strategies can be distinguished:
1. traders of broker j only aim to address counterparties of their own broker j: own;
2. traders of broker j aim to address counterparties of all brokers: all.
It can easily be shown that it is never optimal to target only a subset of other
brokers. All parameters of the model, including Vh, Vl, and ci are known to the investors
and are constant over time. This allows to solve for a stationary equilibrium within
each fee structure as in Foucault (1999), Van Achter (2009), or Colliard and Foucault
(2011). More specically, a stationary market equilibrium is dened as a set of mutual
order submission strategies (specifying an optimal order type, quote and corresponding
execution probability to each possible state of the LOB) such that each traders strategy
is optimal given the strategies of all other traders. Di¤erent types of stationary equilibria
arise. The magnitude of the post-trading fees, the implemented fee schedule as well as
the type of equilibrium inuence stock market liquidity. In Section 3 we discuss the
stationary equilibria corresponding to the di¤erent fee structures.
3 CSD Fee Structures
3.1 Uniform Fee Structure
Under the uniform fee structure, which is denoted by subscript U , the CSD charges a
uniform fee to all orders upon execution and breaks even on average over all transac-
tions.8 Thus, it compensates the losses it makes on the complex (i.e. non-internalized)
order ow stemming from di¤erent brokers with gains from the easy order ow stem-
ming from trades that occur within the same broker (i.e. internalized). Denote this
7As such, the LO execution probabilities are endogenous, implying traders are in a game situation.
In general, tradersoptimal order submission strategies depend on their LOs probability of execution,
which in turn is determined by their order submission strategies. To properly account for these endoge-
nous linkages between the MO and the LO placement strategies, they will be determined simultaneously.
8Recall also that all transactions have to be cleared and settled through the CSD. Therefore, we
now assume that a broker cannot set up its own clearing and settlement system to internalize trades
between its own traders. In case it would, the equilibrium uniform fee would be c and the setup would
coincide with the trade-specic fee structure as analyzed in Subsection 3.2.
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break-even fee by cU , this fee structure then implies that:
cI = cNI = cU
Under this fee structure, it is clear that traders of each broker will always address all
potential counterparties, and not restrict themselves to own-broker counterparties only.
Put in other words: the allstrategy dominates the ownstrategy. The reason is that
as all traders face a uniform fee, it is impossible to set a quote only attractive to traders
of one particular broker.9 Therefore, when analyzing the equilibrium we only consider
the allstrategy.
We now turn to the determination of the equilibrium quotes and the optimal fee
under a uniform CSD fee structure. We solve the model backwards. First, for a given
fee cU we derive tradersorder placement strategies in equilibrium. Second, we solve for
the optimal fee cU . In determining its fee, the CSD rationally anticipates how this fee
a¤ects tradersorder submission behavior.
How do traders set their quotes, taking cU as given? Given that the allstrategy
prevails and that costs and gains are identical for traders of all brokers, it must hold
that bid and ask quotes set by traders of all brokers are identical. We denote this as
follows:
AjU;all = AU;all and B
j
U;all = BU;all; 8j
where AjU;all refers to the ask quote (A) set by a trader from broker j (superscript
j) with uniform fees by the CSD (subscript U) and under the all sub-equilibrium
(subscript all) which prevails here. The bid quote has a similar notation.
Suppose now a buyer arrives in the market. She will set the bid quote of her LO
such that the next incoming seller is indi¤erent between hitting the LO (by submitting
a sell MO) or submitting a sell LO herself. This implies that the expected payo¤ for the
incoming seller of submitting a MO or a LO must be the same. The following equation
shows this indi¤erence condition:




AU;all   Vl   cU

The left hand side of this equation presents the gain from a sell MO, given the bid quote
set by the buyer in the previous period. The right hand side is the expected gain of
a sell LO, which is the execution probability of this order (i.e. 1=2 or the probability
that the next arriving trader is a buyer who will hit the standing sell LO since the seller
optimally also sets her ask quote to make the next arriving buyer indi¤erent) multiplied
by the payo¤ upon execution of her order corrected for the appropriate post-trading fee.
9Do note that if playing the own-strategy would be possible, this would still be a sub-optimal
strategy as it only reduces execution probabilities without inducing any quote advantage.
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Thus, the idea here is that BU;all is chosen at the lowest level at which the subsequently
arriving seller is just willing to submit a MO, while both are accounting for the post-
trading fee cU . In other words, BU;all equals the sellers cuto¤ price and renders this
seller indi¤erent between hitting the standing LO at BU;all and submitting her own LO
at AU;all. Submitting a LO at all other quotes is easily proven to be sub-optimal for this
buyer.
Similarly an arriving seller sets her LO quote in order to make a subsequently arriving
buyer indi¤erent between submitting a buy MO at AU;all or a buy LO at BU;all:




Vh  BU;all   cU

Solving the system of indi¤erence equations yields the quotes for a given uniform fee
cU . Proposition 1 presents the optimal fee and resulting equilibrium quotes and bid-ask
spread (SU;all) for the uniform fee structure.
























  2 (N   1)
3N
c
Proof. See Appendix A.
Under the allstrategy which is played within this fee structure, the fee cU at which





c. Intuitively, this expression
can be seen to capture the costly non-internalized match between counterparties from
the N   1 other brokers and each broker j. By charging cU on both legs of every trans-
action (internalized and non-internalized), the CSD on average breaks even: it gains on
internalized trades for which it does not face marginal costs and loses on non-internalized
trades as active clearing and settlement takes place. By charging a uniform fee on all
transactions, the CSD removes the advantage for the trader of being matched with a
10This computed spread is actually never observed in the market at a single point in time. We merely
use it as a proxy for average liquidity during trading. Further, the computed spread is only negative
when Vh   Vl < 2N 1N c. That is, when the potential trading gains of a transaction are fully annihilated





c. Evidently, under these circumstances, there will be no trading
at all.
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counterparty of the own broker and the disadvantage of being matched with a counter-
party of another broker. Furthermore, we observe that, for N  2, the ask decreases
in c, while the bid increases in c. Consequently, the resulting spread decreases. Thus,






liquid quote-setting behavior and improves stock market liquidity. The reasoning behind
this remarkable result is that traders submit more aggressive LOs in order to induce the
counterparty to submit a MO (which incurs the post-trading fee with certainty). That
is, it is as if the counterparty now has a lower willingness to trade resulting from the
increase in the post-trading fee. Moreover, holding c constant, when the broker industry
concentration 1=N increases due to a lower number of brokers N , the spread increases
(i.e. the ask increases and the bid drops). The reasoning is that a lower N leads to a
smaller fraction of non-internalized trades and as a result a lower uniform fee. This in
turn induces a less aggressive pricing strategy.
Next, we distinguish between observed liquidityand cum-fee liquidity. Denition
1 provides the denition of both concepts.
Denition 1 Observed liquidity corresponds to the bid-ask spread or the quotes as
observable in the market. Cum-fee liquidity corresponds to the bid-ask spread or the
quotes from the point of view of the market order trader after adding the relevant post-
trading fees.
When the concept liquidity is mentioned without any further detail, this always
corresponds to observed liquidity. When referring to cum-fee liquidity, this is always
stated explicitly.





U;all   cU (1)




Clearly, cum-fee liquidity is lower than observed liquidity. Moreover, and in contrast
to observed liquidity, cum-fee liquidity decreases in c and increases in broker industry
concentration 1=N . There is a less than complete pass-through of cU as the observed
liquidity partially absorbs increases of cU . Corollary 1 summarizes the empirical impli-
cations of the equilibrium under uniform CSD fees.
Corollary 1 Under uniform fees by the CSD and ceteris paribus:
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 Observed liquidity increases with the post-trading fee cU ;
 Observed liquidity decreases with broker industry concentration 1=N ;
 Cum-fee liquidity is lower than observed liquidity;
 Cum-fee liquidity decreases with the post-trading fee cU ;
 Cum-fee liquidity increases with broker industry concentration 1=N .
3.2 Trade-Specic Fee Structure
Under the trade-specic fee structure, denoted by subscript TS, we assume the CSD
breaks even by pricing according to the marginal costs that are associated with individual
transactions. That is, post-trading fees are set to zero for internalized trades, and amount
to c for non-internalized trades. As argued before, note that the zero cost attributed
to internalized trades merely represents a normalization. More generally, as long as
internalized trades imply lower marginal costs than non-internalized trades, all results
obtained below hold. In terms of the notation introduced in Section 2, we have:
cI = 0
cNI = c
A novel implication of these di¤erent fees is that the quoting behavior of traders linked
to a specic broker j may be to target only traders a¢ liated to the same broker j (the
ownstrategy), or to target traders of all brokers (the allstrategy). Consider the
following example to illustrate this point. Assume a buyer linked to broker j arrives
in the market. On the one hand, she could submit a LO. Her quote choice allows
her to choose which counterparties she wants to address: (i) by posting a lower bid,
she only attracts counterparties from the same broker implying a higher payo¤ with
a lower execution probability, whereas (ii) by posting a higher bid, she also attracts
counterparties from the other brokers implying a lower payo¤ with a higher execution
probability. Do note BjTS;own is the lowest bid quote at which an incoming seller from
the same broker is willing to submit a MO (while accounting for the according zero
post-trading fee and her own LO strategy quoting AjTS;own, and given that traders from
another broker play an ownstrategy). In turn, BjTS;all is the lowest bid quote at which
an incoming seller from another broker j0 6= j is willing to submit a MO (while accounting
for the according higher post-trading fee c and her own LO strategy quoting AjTS;all, and
given that traders from broker j0 play an allstrategy). Submitting a LO at any other
quote is easily proven to be sub-optimal for this buyer.11 On the other hand, given the
11That is, higher bid quotes do not increase the execution probability yielding lower expected payo¤s.
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availability of a standing sell LO which is attractive to her, she could also submit a MO.
A buyer a¢ liated to broker j0 faces a similar trade-o¤. Further, as the proportion of
buyers and sellers in the trader population is equal, the actions of sellers linked to all
brokers are completely symmetric, and is derived in a similar way. As we will see below,
the choice between these quotes hinges on market parameters such as the number of
brokers with its associated execution probability, and the post-trading fee. For both
alland ownstrategy, we will now determine the according equilibrium quotes set
by traders at both brokers. The fee structure of the CSD (i.e. zero fee for internalized
trades, c for non-internalized trades), is again taken as given by the traders.
Starting with the all strategy, traders at each broker j set their quote to keep
the marginal other-broker trader indi¤erent as they want to address all traders.12 Thus,
they account for the post-trading fee c. So for buyers and sellers from each broker j, we
respectively have:






















Thus, within the rst indi¤erence condition for instance, the incoming seller from any
other broker j0 6= j is kept indi¤erent between hitting the standing quote BjTS;all by
submitting a sell MO (accounting for the appropriate post-trading fee c) and submitting
her own sell LO (of which the execution probability, the quote and the post-trading
fee c correctly correspond to the all strategy this seller is playing herself). Similar
indi¤erence conditions apply for traders from all other brokers j0 6= j. As all brokers are








Next, within the own strategy, all traders only keep potential counterparties of
their own broker indi¤erent. Hence, all trades are internalized and thus incur a zero
post-trading fee. The indi¤erence equations for buyer and seller from any broker then
become:












Thus, within the rst indi¤erence condition for instance, the incoming seller from broker
j is kept indi¤erent between hitting the standing quote BjTS;own by submitting a sell MO
(accounting for the appropriate zero post-trading fee) and submitting her own sell LO
12Evidently, traders from the same broker always accept this quote as they face no fees.
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(of which the execution probability, the quote and the zero post-trading fee correctly
correspond to the ownstrategy this seller is playing herself). At these quotes, only
traders from broker j are indi¤erent. For traders originating from other brokers j0 6= j
trading at these quotes is too costly given their higher post-trading fee c. Therefore, the
execution probabilities are only related to those of the own broker j. Similar equations
apply for all N brokers.
Solving the above systems of indi¤erence conditions renders the equilibrium quotes
and thus the two distinct alland ownsub-equilibria. Comparing expected payo¤s
for each of the sub-equilibria, we are able to determine when each of the sub-equilibria
is valid. All these elements are shown in the equilibrium presented in Proposition 2.
Proposition 2 With a CSD applying trade-specic (marginal cost-based) fees, traders
at every broker play the following LO strategies hinging on the value of c:
 For low values of c, i.e. c  2N(N 1)(Vh Vl)
(2N+1)(2N 1) , traders from every broker target coun-
terparties of all brokers, thus the allsub-equilibrium is played. The equilibrium

















  2 (N + 1)
3N
c
 For high values of c, i.e. c > 2N(N 1)(Vh Vl)
(2N+1)(2N 1) , traders from each broker only target
own counterparties, thus the own sub-equilibrium is played. The equilibrium








2 (N   1)
2N + 1
(Vh   Vl)
Proof. See Appendix A.
First, for low values of c the allsub-equilibrium holds and traders at each broker
target counterparties at all brokers by quoting relatively liquid prices. The quotes depend
on the fee c for non-internalized trades. Holding N xed, we nd that observed quotes




3N c < 0 can never be jointly satised.
14Do note that this computed spread is always positive for N  2.
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(and thus also the resulting spread computed from these quotes) become more liquid
if c increases. Hence, observed market liquidity improves with higher post-trading fees
within this c range. Next, at given c it can easily be seen that the quotes become more
illiquid when N becomes larger. The reasoning is as follows. If a trader places a limit
order, with probability 1= (2N) this order will be hit by a trader from her own broker.
In that case, both traders receive a bonusas they both do not have to pay c. If the
number of brokers N is large (i.e. a less concentrated broker industry) the probability
of this bonus is small making the threat of the arriving trader to submit a limit order
herself less present. Thus, quotes are set at a less liquid level.
Second, within the other sub-equilibrium holding for higher c, the ownstrategy is
played and relatively illiquid prices are quoted. As all trades are internalized (implying
zero post-trading fees are charged), evidently quoted prices are independent of c. In turn,
the liquidity of the observed quotes increases with broker industry concentration 1=N :
the outside option of the next trader (submitting a LO instead of hitting a standing LO
order) becomes more attractive since - under the ownstrategy - execution probabilities
increase with lower N .
Furthermore, from Proposition 2, it also follows directly that STS;all < S

TS;own (given
that N  2). In other words, the observed spread under the all strategy is always
smaller - or liquidity is higher - than the observed spread under the ownstrategy.
Next, observed liquidity can again be contrasted with cum-fee liquidity. Compared to
the uniform fee structure equilibrium, however, we now no longer have one but two cases:
the alland the ownsub-equilibrium. Within the ownsub-equilibrium, evidently
observed quotes are identical to cum-fee quotes (as all trades are internalized implying
zero post-trading fees are charged), and thus all results on increases in c and N derived
for the observable quotes continue to hold. In contrast, within the allsub-equilibrium,
traders stemming from di¤erent brokers may trade resulting in the following cum-fee ask
and bid quotes, respectively: ATS;all + c and B

TS;all   c. These quotes imply a cum-fee
spread of STS;all + 2c. Transacting buyer and seller may, however, also be a¢ liated to
the same broker. The trade is then internalized and cum-fee ask and bid quotes are
ATS;all + 0 and B

TS;all   0, respectively. These quotes imply a cum-fee spread equal
to the (observed) spread STS;all. Do note that these two possibilities within the all
sub-equilibrium point to a key di¤erence between post-trading fees and make/take fees
as modeled in Colliard and Foucault (2011). Make/take fees are charged to everyone
in each trade. In contrast, in our setting post-trading fees are trade-dependent: non-
internalized trades are charged a high fee c, while internalized trades are charged a zero
fee. The size of c may lead to the allsub-equilibrium or the ownsub-equilibrium
being played, implying distinct trading intensities. Weighing each cum-fee quote by its
average rate of occurrence within the all sub-equilibrium allows us to compute the
15





























Clearly, within the all sub-equilibrium, cum-fee liquidity is lower than liquidity
observed in the market. Moreover, in contrast to observed liquidity, cum-fee liquidity
decreases in post-trading fees (for N > 2) and decreases with broker industry concen-
tration. Corollary 2 summarizes the main empirical implications of the trade-specic fee
structure.
Corollary 2 Under trade-specic fees by the CSD and ceteris paribus:
 Observed liquidity increases (under the allsub-equilibrium) or remains constant
(under the own sub-equilibrium) with the post-trading fee for non-internalized
trades c;
 Observed liquidity increases with broker industry concentration 1=N ;
 Observed liquidity in the all sub-equilibrium is higher than in the own sub-
equilibrium;
 Cum-fee liquidity is lower than (under the allsub-equilibrium) or equal to (under
the ownsub-equilibrium) observed liquidity;
 Cum-fee liquidity decreases (under the allsub-equilibrium) or remains constant
(under the own sub-equilibrium) with the post-trading fee for non-internalized
trades c;
 Cum-fee liquidity decreases (under the allsub-equilibrium) or increases (under
the ownsub-equilibrium) with broker industry concentration 1=N .
4 Market Quality and Welfare: Comparison of CSD
Fee Structures
In the rst subsection we compare the implications of the di¤erent fee structures set
by the CSD on market quality. We do so by investigating liquidity as measured by the
bid-ask spread, and by focusing on trading volume. In a next subsection we discuss the
16
impact of CSD fees on welfare. To highlight our main points, we illustrate the results of
our model using the following parameter values: Vh = 20, Vl = 0, N = 5 and c varies in
the interval [0; 20]. Important to stress is that all results are general, and do not depend
on these specic parameter values and ranges.
4.1 Market Quality
4.1.1 Liquidity: Bid-Ask Spreads
We start with observed liquidity as derived from quotes and spreads observable in the
markets. Using the spreads presented in Propositions 1 and 2, it is easy to show that
when the allsub-equilibrium under trade-specic fees holds, spreads are lower for the
trade-specic fee structure. The reasoning is that the arriving market order trader that
is kept indi¤erent incurs a higher post-trading fee under the trade-specic fee structure
than under the uniform fee structure. In contrast, when the own sub-equilibrium
under trade-specic fees holds, the spread is more liquid under uniform fees. Thus,
which CSD fee structure maximizes market liquidity depends on the parameters driving
the cuto¤ value between the ownand the allsub-equilibrium: Vh, Vl, c and N . This
result brings us to Corollary 3.
Corollary 3 Regulators can improve market liquidity by imposing a fee structure on the
CSD. The liquidity-optimizing fee structure depends on the trading gains level Vh   Vl,
the magnitude of c and the concentration in the broker industry 1=N .
Next, we consider cum-fee liquidity as measured by the cum-fee spread, i.e. the
observed bid-ask spread adjusted for post-trading fees. Cum-fee spreads were computed
in Equation (2) for uniform fees and Equation (4) for trade-specic fees. From these
equations, it could be derived that cum-fee and observed liquidity may provide opposite
results. For low c, when the allsub-equilibrium is played under trade-specic fees,
uniform fees lead to lower liquidity, both observed and cum-fee. However, when c is
su¢ ciently high, and we are already in the ownsub-equilibrium under trade-specic
fees, observed liquidity is higher under uniform fees while cum-fee liquidity is higher
under trade-specic fees.
The above-mentioned results are illustrated in Figure 1, where in Panel A we depict
the observed bid-ask spreads as a function of c for our two CSD fee structures. The
line with stars  represents spreads for the uniform fee structure (computed as in
Proposition 1), and the lines with squares  indicates spreads corresponding to the
two sub-equilibria within the trade-specic fee structure (computed as in Proposition
2). In turn, Panel B shows average cum-fee bid-ask spreads, computed using Equations
(2) and (4). Note that if c becomes extremely high (i.e. if c is higher than the gains
that can be obtained from trading) the market shuts down.
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Please insert Figure 1 around here.
4.1.2 Trading Volume
In the previous subsection, we focused on liquidity as measured by bid-ask spreads.
Now, we turn to trading volume, another measure for market liquidity often used in the
literature and by practitioners. In doing so, we follow a similar approach as Colliard
and Foucault (2011) by focusing on trading rates per period. In each period, we observe
one out of the following three possible states (i.e. actions): (1) a trader submits a
limit order; (2) a trader submits a market order that is internalized (i.e. a trader hits
a standing limit order submitted by another trader of the same broker); (3) a trader
submits a market order that is not internalized (i.e. a trader hits a limit order submitted
by a trader from another broker). We do not need to make a distinction between buyers
and sellers because both sides of the market are symmetric in our model. For each fee
structure of the CSD k 2 fU; TSg, denote the stationary probabilities of each of these









Sk denotes the set of all possible sub-equilibria under fee structure k. Hence, for the
uniform fee structure SU = fallg, while under trade-specic fees STS = fall; owng.
In Appendix B, we derive the exact expressions for the various 'k;s. Based on these
stationary probabilities, we can now easily develop measures for trading volume (i.e. the
trading rate) and the degree of internalization (i.e. the internalization rate) for each
sub-equilibrium within each fee structure.
The trading rate TR in a period under sub-equilibrium s of fee structure k is the
likelihood of a market order initiating a trade in a given period. Clearly, this occurs in






In turn, the internalization rate is the likelihood of a market order initiating an inter-






and can be seen as the percentage of trades that is internalized. The non-internalization
rate is then equal to 1  IRk;s.
Proposition 3 presents the trading rates and internalization rates for the di¤erent fee
structures.
Proposition 3 Trading rates and internalization rates for the di¤erent CSD fee struc-
tures are as follows:
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Proof. See Appendix A.
Since N  2, we obtain that TRU;all = TRTS;all  TRTS;own implying that trading
volume is highest when the CSD applies uniform fees, or when c is small such that the
allsub-equilibrium applies under trade-specic fees. For the internalization rates, we
have that IRU;all = IR

TS;all  IRU;own. The latter rate is obviously equal to one since
in the ownsub-equilibrium all trades are internalized. Further, do note that trading
volume is not directly related to market liquidity as measured by quote aggressiveness.
This can be seen most easily from the fact that TRU;all = TR

TS;all, while the aggres-
siveness of ask quotes for the according cases as derived in the previous subsection is
di¤erent. In the next subsection, we use these trading and internalization rates to derive
welfare implications of the di¤erent fee structures.
4.2 Overall Welfare
In this subsection, we characterize welfare for the two CSD fee structures. Our welfare
measure builds on rational trader behavior and is therefore identical to the mean
realized ex post welfare per period. We focus on overall welfare (OW ), i.e. the sum
of all agentsexpected utilities from trading (see Glosten (1998), Goettler, Parlour and
Rajan (2005), Hollield, Miller, Sandås and Slive (2006), and Degryse, Van Achter and
Wuyts (2009) for a similar approach in quantifying welfare). As the CSD always breaks
even in expected terms, in our model OW coincides with trader welfare.
Welfare is realized when a trade occurs. An internalized trade generates Vh   Vl,
whereas a non-internalized trade produces Vh   Vl   2c. Thus, when non-internalized
trades occur in equilibrium, an increase in c reduces the surplus to be split between
buyer and seller involved in the transaction. In turn, the prices at which trades occur
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are not relevant for welfare as they only represent a redistribution between buyer and
seller. Expected overall welfare per period within fee structure k and sub-equilibrium
s is computed by multiplying the trading rate TRk;s with the welfare realized in the
occurrence of a trade (appropriately weighing internalized and non-internalized trades):
OWk;s = TRk;s






Proposition 4 summarizes our main results regarding overall per-period welfare for
both CSD fee structures.
Proposition 4 Expected overall welfare per period depends on the CSD fee structure.










 Under trade-specic fees, it hinges on the sub-equilibria:
For low values of c, i.e. c  2N(N 1)(Vh Vl)











For high values of c, i.e. c > 2N(N 1)(Vh Vl)






Proof. See Appendix A.
Next, we determine which fee structure a social planner prefers depending upon the
magnitude of c.15 In fact, the social planner faces the following trade-o¤. On the one
hand, it wants to maximize the trading rate as this increases trading gains. On the
other hand, it prefers internalized trades above non-internalized trades as the former do
not generate post-trading costs. Therefore it also cares about the internalization rate.
Corollary 4 presents welfare rankings for the entire range of c.
Corollary 4 Expected per-period overall welfare ranking for the entire range of c.
 For low values of c, i.e. c  N(Vh Vl)
2N+1
, we nd that OW U;all = OW

TS;all  OW TS;own.
Only the uniform fee structure achieves the all sub-equilibrium for the entire
range of c  N(Vh Vl)
2N+1
, the trade-specic fee structure achieves the all sub-
equilibrium for c  2N(N 1)(Vh Vl)
(2N+1)(2N 1) ;
15We assume the social planner can only impose the fee structure it prefers and does not intervene
in the trading and post-trading phase.
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 For high values of c, i.e. c > N(Vh Vl)
2N+1
, we nd that OW TS;own > OW

TS;all =
OW U;all. Only the trade-specic fee structure achieves the own sub-equilibrium
for c > N(Vh Vl)
2N+1
.
Hence when the cost of a non-internalized trade is low (i.e. when c  N(Vh Vl)
2N+1
), the so-
cial planner will choose to maximize the trading rate through the allsub-equilibrium.
It could do so by imposing uniform fees. Imposing trade-specic fees only yields the
socially optimal all sub-equilibrium for c  2N(N 1)(Vh Vl)
(2N+1)(2N 1) . However, when the cost
of a non-internalized transaction becomes too large (i.e. when c > N(Vh Vl)
2N+1
), the social
planner wants to prevent expensive non-internalized trades from occurring as these are
welfare-reducing and prefers the ownsub-equilibrium, thus aiming to maximize the
internalization rate. Only the trade-specic fee structure succeeds in producing this
outcome. Furthermore, with extremely high values of c (or extremely low gains from
trade), trade-specic fees allow to create a market for internalized trades only, whereas
markets would collapse under uniform fees since this yields zero prots and welfare.
We illustrate Proposition 4 and Corollary 4 graphically in Figure 2 using the same
parameter values as before. The line represents overall welfare for the uniform fee
structure, and the lines for the trade-specic fee structure.
Please insert Figure 2 around here.
Our welfare results show that maximizing welfare may conict with maximizing
liquidity. Recall from Corollary 3 that the maximum observed liquidity for high values
of c is achieved under the uniform fee structure. However, uniform fees produces lowest
welfare in this range of c. As a consequence, a social planner potentially has to choose
between liquidity and social welfare when setting its regulation for a fee structure to
be implemented by the CSD: a fee structure implying higher market liquidity in fact
reduces social welfare. Moreover, for very low c, both fee structures yield the same
welfare, although observed liquidity di¤ers under each fee structure. This leads to the
following result in Corollary 5.
Corollary 5 The observed bid-ask spread is not always an appropriate measure for wel-
fare.
5 Extensions
In the main model, we have made a number of assumptions regarding the market power
of the CSD, the transparency of the traders identity, and the individual broker size. In
this section, we discuss three extensions relaxing each of these assumptions. As such, we
investigate how these extensions a¤ect our main results obtained above, and delineate
the yielded additional insights.
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5.1 Extension 1: Market Power for CSD
Thus far, we assumed that the CSD, when implementing its fee structure, aims to break
even on average. In other words, the CSD always behaves perfectly competitive. In
this subsection, we alter this assumption and allow the CSD to possess market power in
setting the fee it charges to its customers. More specically, we assume that the CSD
has monopoly power when setting the fee charged to non-internalized trades, but has
no pricing power for internalized trades. This assumption is realistic since brokers can
always set-up an own clearing and settlement system for internalized trades if the CSD
does not charge a competitive fee for this type of trade. For non-internalized trades,
establishing a clearing and settlement system is much more di¢ cult, and therefore the
CSD may have pricing power for such trades. Given that the CSD di¤erentiates its fees
between types of trades, we only analyze the trade-specic fee structure.
The CSD will now set a fee of cmTS;s for non-internalized trades (as opposed to c under
perfect competition) and a zero fee for internalized trades. cmTS;s denotes the CSD fee
under monopoly m, trade-specic fee structure TS and sub-equilibrium s 2 STS with
STS the set of all possible sub-equilibria under trade-specic fees: STS = fall; owng.
For all relevant variables in this subsection, the superscript m thus refers to the model
featuring monopoly power for the CSD. The CSD wants to set cmTS;s to maximize expected
prots per period. In doing so, it faces a trade-o¤: by setting cmTS;s too high, the CSD
may alter the equilibrium played by traders. For instance, if it sets cmTS;s very high, the
consequence will be that the own sub-equilibrium prevails, driving expected prots
of the CSD to zero since it has no pricing power for internalized trades. Therefore, the
CSD aims to maximize expected prots by setting cmTS;s at a maximum, within the all
sub-equilibrium. Otherwise the CSD has zero expected prots as the ownstrategy is










s:t: Vh   Vl  2cmTS;s
In the objective function cmTS;s c represents the CSDs mark-up above the marginal cost
of the trade, TRk;s is the trading rate and 1 IRk;s is the proportion of non-internalized
trades. We multiply by two because the CSD charges the fee (and thus obtains the prot)
on each leg of the trade. The constraint implies that the monopoly fee can only be as
high as the total gains of trade.
Using the trading rates and the internalization rates from Proposition 3, expected
per-period prots of the CSD under the di¤erent sub-equilibria are as given in Proposi-
tion 5.
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Proposition 5 If a CSD applies trade-specic fees and has monopoly pricing power on
non-internalized trades, traders play the following strategies hinging on c:
 For low values of c, i.e. c  2N(N 1)(Vh Vl)
(2N+1)(2N 1) , traders play the allsub-equilibrium.
The optimal fee for non-internalized trades set by the CSD is
cm;TS;all =
2N(N   1) (Vh   Vl)
(2N + 1) (2N   1)

































(2N + 1) (2N   1)
 For high values of c, i.e. c > 2N(N 1)(Vh Vl)
(2N+1)(2N 1) , traders of every broker only target own









(2N   1) (Vh   Vl)
(2N + 1)
The per-period prot of the CSD is zero.
Proof. See Appendix A.
Next, we compare this setting with the perfect competition case of our main model.
In fact, granting monopoly power to the CSD does not inuence the equilibrium played.
The only di¤erence compared to the perfect competition case is that the CSD charges a
fee such that all extra rents from the allsub-equilibrium compared to the ownsub-
equilibrium are expropriated from the trader and now ow to the CSD. More specically,
the CSD optimally charges cm;TS;all: at this fee, the traders are indi¤erent between the all
strategy and the ownstrategy. Charging a higher fee is not optimal as the traders then
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will adopt the ownstrategy. When c is larger than the cut-o¤ value 2N(N 1)(Vh Vl)
(2N+1)(2N 1) ,
the traders play ownand the CSD can never make a prot. Furthermore, in compar-
ison with the competitive case, the equilibrium quotes in the allsub-equilibrium are
di¤erent, and in general more aggressive. The reason is that counterparties need to be
compensated for the higher post-trading fees. These results demonstrate that imperfect
competition (market power) at the post trading phase has an e¤ect on market liquidity
during the trading phase.
As a nal step in this extension, we investigate the welfare implications of having
a monopolist CSD. Notice that overall welfare is not a¤ected in the monopoly setting.
Indeed, there is only a redistribution of welfare among market participants. While in the
competitive case, all welfare is realized by traders, under monopoly the CSD skims some
of the welfare from the traders. Proposition 6 provides the precise welfare distribution
between the CSD and traders.
Proposition 6 If a CSD applies trade-specic fees and has monopoly pricing power on
non-internalized trades, expected per-period welfare realized by the CSD (CSDW ) and





























with the optimal fee that the monopolist CSD charges equal to:
cm;TS;all =
2N(N   1) (Vh   Vl)
(2N + 1) (2N   1)
Proof. See Appendix A.
From Proposition 6 it is easily seen that CSD welfare is weakly increasing in N : the
less concentrated the broker industry under the all sub-equilibrium, the higher the
expected prots the CSD obtains. In contrast, under the ownsub-equilibrium, CSD
welfare is una¤ected by N . Trader welfare on the other hand is decreasing in N in both
sub-equilibria.
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5.2 Extension 2: Anonymous Trading
In a second extension, we relax the assumption of transparency in the trading process
(while again assuming a perfectly competitive CSD).16 In particular, we assume that
an arriving trader cannot observe the identity behind the counterpartys quote. Conse-
quently, a trader cannot observe whether her counterparty stems from the same broker
and thus whether a trade would be internalized or not. We implicitly assume that if
the identity of a trader is observed, so is the identity of the traders broker (which is
the relevant feature in our model). Motivated by real-world nancial markets, we dis-
tinguish between two anonymity settings. The rst is a setting where the trader has no
means to reveal her identity and trading is completely anonymous. The second is a case
where the trader can choose to reveal her identity by attaching a so-called agto her
limit order. This corresponds to common practice in some markets where limit order
submitters have the option to reveal their identity. For instance, since 2005 the Toronto
Stock Exchange o¤ers attribution choicesto its traders/members on an order-by-order
basis.17 Attributing a limit order entails a unique broker identier visible to all market
participants that is attached to this order. Comerton-Forde, Putnins and Tang (2011)
provide an empirical analysis of this setting. In general, do note our anonymity exten-
sion is only relevant under a trade-specic fee structure, since under uniform fees, no
distinction in fees exists between internalized and non-internalized trades.
Under transparency, the traders identity is always revealed. The quotes in this
equilibrium have been shown in Proposition 2. In contrast, with full anonymity, there
are no means to reveal the identity of the trader. Therefore, an arriving trader does
not know whether a standing limit order stems from a trader of her own broker or from
another broker.18 Consequently, she is uncertain about the CSD fees she will incur






c, as shown in the proof of Proposition 7. Thus, the
full anonymity setting is shown to perfectly coincide with the uniform fee case shown
in Proposition 1. Next, we focus on the setting where traders have the choice to reveal
their identity using a ag, which we label anonymity with ag. In fact, the equilibrium
played is fully determined by investors submitting limit orders, rather than by market
order traders. The reasoning is that limit orders are submitted before market orders.19
First, consider the all strategy. Comparing the respective payo¤s of using a ag
versus not using a ag, we show in the proof of Proposition 7 that limit order traders
always opt not to reveal their identity under the allstrategy as quotes are more liquid
16For a discussion of anonymity, see e.g. Foucault, Moinas and Theissen (2007) or Rindi (2008).
17See http://www.tmx.com/en/listings/newsletters/article_5.html for some descriptive information.
18Evidently, the arriving trader also accounts for the fact she is not able to reveal her identity when
submitting a limit order herself.
19An alternative setup would be that traders jointly decide on the transparency regime before the
trading day starts.
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when using a ag. In contrast, when setting a quote according to the ownstrategy,
traders do opt to reveal their identity and attach a ag to their order.20 Overall, as long
as c is small enough (i.e. c  N(Vh Vl)
2N+1
), payo¤s under allare larger than payo¤s under
own (see proof). Otherwise, the own strategy yields the limit order submitters
a greater payo¤. In sum, when limit order traders can endogenously determine the
transparency regime themselves by having the choice to reveal their identity, markets
will be fully anonymous for c  N(Vh Vl)
2N+1
. Otherwise, an identity-revealing ag is attached
to limit orders. This result shows that the preferred microstructure of a trading venue
may depend in part on the post-trading phase. Proposition 7 presents the equilibrium
quotes and spreads for the anonymity and anonymity with ag cases, which are denoted
by superscript a and af , respectively.
Proposition 7 With a CSD applying trade-specic fees, traders at all brokers play the
following LO strategies:
 If traders cannot reveal their identity (i.e. anonymity), then they always play the

















  2 (N   1)
3N
c
 If traders can reveal their identity through the use of a ag(i.e. anonymity with
ag). The equilibrium then hinges on the value of c:
For low values of c, i.e. c  N(Vh Vl)
2N+1
, traders from each broker target coun-
terparties of all brokers, thus the all sub-equilibrium is played, no traders























  2 (N   1)
3N
c
For high values of c, i.e. c > N(Vh Vl)
2N+1
, traders from each broker only target
own counterparties by revealing their identity, thus the ownsub-equilibrium
20An alternative interpretation is when traders are able to submit quotes on an own broker-crossing
network (where only clients can post limit orders).
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Proof. See Appendix A.
Furthermore, we investigate which setting  anonymity, anonymity with ag, or
transparency a social planner prefers in case it could impose one. Recall from Corol-
lary 4 that the social planner prefers the allsub-equilibrium when c  N(Vh Vl)
2N+1
and
the own sub-equilibrium for larger c. As this outcome exactly coincides with the
anonymity with ag case (which has the same cuto¤ point), the social planner always
prefers this in-betweensetting over the anonymity and the transparency settings. Con-
sequently, within Figure 2, the anonymity with ag case corresponds to the maximum
welfare curve. Thus the anonymity with ag case perfectly reects the socially opti-
mal balance between the trading rate and the internalization rate in view of c. This is
because it o¤ers the unique combination of having traders to account for the correct
uniform break even fee when they play the allstrategy, while still allowing them to
reveal their identity and play a zero-fee ownstrategy when c becomes high.
5.3 Extension 3: Di¤erent Broker Sizes
In a nal extension, we consider asymmetries across brokers. Thus far, all brokers had
an equal share of a¢ liated traders. We now introduce large and small brokers, and
investigate the impact of this setting on our ndings. To conserve space, in this subsec-
tion we only present the general setup of the altered model, and its main conclusions
hereby focusing on additional insights with respect to the ones presented in the main
model. The formal development of the altered model and proofs of all propositions and
corollaries is omitted for brevity and can be found in a supplementary appendix to this
paper. Furthermore, to focus on the main ideas and intuitions and to keep the exposi-
tion tractable, we x the number of brokers at two (i.e. N = 2) and assume that the
market shares of both brokers are di¤erent. More specically, a fraction  (with  > 1
2
)
of the total trader population is linked to the large broker, and a complementary
fraction 1    is linked to the smallone. Broker a¢ liations are indexed by subscript
j 2 flarge; smallg. Because traders from di¤erent brokers now may possibly choose
di¤erent strategies, we need to introduce some additional notation. Let fall; allg now
denote the combination of strategies where traders of the large broker (rst element)
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play the allstrategy and traders from the small broker (second element) also play the
allstrategy; fown; allg and fown; owng then have a similar interpretation.21
Under uniform fees, the fall; allg combination of strategies is still the only equilib-
rium. Moreover, the empirical implications of Corollary 1 remain valid: observed market
liquidity is increasing in c, and decreasing in  (i.e. the larger the market share of the
large broker , the lower observed liquidity becomes). Next, under trade-specic fees,
introducing di¤erent broker sizes does lead to a number of additional insights, compared
to our baseline model. Interestingly, now three possible sub-equilibria exist. Moreover,
the quoting behavior of traders is no longer always identical: traders stemming from
the large and small broker may quote di¤erent prices for their LO. We now briey dis-
cuss the three distinct sub-equilibria. First, for low values of c, traders at both brokers
target counterparties at all brokers by quoting relatively liquid prices. Consequently,
the fall; allg sub-equilibrium applies. Still, an interesting divergence arises compared
to our main model. Traders from the small broker have to quote more liquid prices as
compared to traders linked to the large broker. The reason is that they need to convince
traders from the large broker (who face the opportunity to submit a LO featuring lower
expected post-trading fees) to accept their LO. Do note that given this quote setting be-
havior, in case a counterparty from the same broker hits a standing quote, both traders
involved in the trade receive a bonusas they both do not have to pay c. An increase
in the large brokers market share  evidently induces traders from the large broker to
quote relatively less liquid prices, whereas traders from the small broker are obliged to
quote relatively more liquid prices to remain attractive to the traders from the large bro-
ker. Second, for su¢ ciently large post-trading costs (inducing larger cost savings from
internalization), both traders from the large and the small broker only address own-
broker counterparties such that the fown; owng sub-equilibrium applies. Compared to
the fall; allg sub-equilibrium relatively illiquid prices are quoted, and now the quotes
from the small broker are more illiquid as they face a lower execution probability. All
quoted prices are also independent of the post-trading fees as these strategies aim at
targeting own-broker counterparties only. Third, and this is a new sub-equilibrium, for
an intermediate range of post-trading costs traders from the large broker still prefer
to target counterparties at their own broker only. They thus set a more illiquid quote
since compensating the post-trading fee c a potentially arriving counterparty from the
small broker would face, is no longer necessary. In contrast, traders at the small broker
alter their strategy and submit relatively liquid quotes targeting all traders. They do so
because the gain from increased matching probabilities still outweighs the concessions in
terms of aggressive pricing. Hence, within this intermediate post-trading costs range an
fown; allg sub-equilibrium is played. Corollary 6 presents the general additional result
21Recall that the notation in the main model, e.g. the allstrategy, could accordingly be read as
fall; all; :::; allg.
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this asymmetric broker size equilibrium brings.
Corollary 6 When brokers di¤er in size and a trade-specic fee structure holds, bid and
ask quotes of traders hinge upon their broker a¢ liation due to post-trading fees.
A direct consequence of this corollary is that markets can become more or less liquid
at points in time, depending on which group of traders (from the large or small broker)
dominates the trader population at that point.
We illustrate the ask quotes under the uniform and trade-specic fee structures when
brokers di¤er in size in Figure 3. The lines correspond to the uniform fee structure,
whereas the lines represent the trade-specic fee structure.22 For the trade-specic
fee structure, the di¤erent parts correspond to the three distinct sub-equilibria. Panel
A draws the ask quotes for traders stemming from the large (full lines) and small broker
(dotted lines). In Panel B, we present the average ask quote by taking a weighted
average of the quotes of large and small brokers traders, using the market share of the
respective broker (i.e.  and 1   ) as weights. Prices are reported instead of spreads,
as there no longer is a unique bid-ask spread due to the fact that traders from large and
small brokers quote di¤erent prices. Within Panel A we observe, as already mentioned
in the discussion above, that traders from the large and the small broker may quote
di¤erent prices because of di¤erences in post-trading fees. Next, Panel B indicates that
the CSD fee structure as well as the level of c inuence the average observed liquidity.
For low levels of c, the average ask quote under the trade-specic fee structure is most
liquid. In contrast, for intermediate and high levels of c the market is most liquid
under uniform fees. This nding has policy implications for a regulator who wants to
maximize observed liquidity. Technological progress, lowering c, may induce a regulator
to implement trade-specic fees instead of uniform fees. Therefore, as in our main model,
regulators can improve market liquidity by imposing a fee structure on CSD. The optimal
fee structure depends on c.
Please insert Figure 3 around here.
Welfare results with di¤erent broker sizes are illustrated in Figure 4. The  line
represents welfare for the uniform fee structure, and the lines for the trade-specic
fee structure. As before, the gure highlights a trade-o¤ for the social planner. Re-
call that the maximum liquidity for high values of c is achieved under the uniform fee
structure. However, uniform fees produce the lowest welfare in this range of c. As a
consequence, a social planner potentially has to choose between liquidity and social wel-
fare when setting its regulation for a fee structure to be implemented by the CSD: a fee
22The exact formulas underlying this gure can be found in the supplementary appendix, which can
be found on http://www.econ.kuleuven.be/public/ndaaf41/Files/Internet-Appendix.pdf.
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structure implying higher market liquidity in fact reduces social welfare. Moreover, for
very low c, both fee structures yield the same welfare, although observed liquidity di¤ers
under each fee structure. This leads to the following result, also obtained in the main
model: the bid-ask spread is not always an appropriate measure for welfare.
Please insert Figure 4 around here.
6 Concluding Remarks
Explicit transaction costs such as the fees related to clearing and settlement are of
considerable importance in todays nancial markets. Both in the US and Europe,
policies have been implemented in order to reduce post-trading fees. In this paper,
we model how internalization of clearing and settlement a¤ects liquidity in nancial
markets. We nd that explicit transaction costs (such as clearing and settlement fees)
a¤ect liquidity in nancial markets. Two distinct fee structures are analyzed. First,
under a uniform fee structure, higher post-trading fees tend to increase observed liquidity.
The reasoning is that larger post-trading fees induce more aggressive limit order pricing
to convince counterparties to trade. Moreover, the concentration of the broker industry
is important: if there is more concentration in the broker industry, this allows the
clearing and settlement agent to reduce post-trading fees due to increased internalization
opportunities, which in turn induces a decrease in observed liquidity. Second, under a
trade-specic fee structure, traders face the following trade-o¤hinging on the level of the
post-trading fees. With low post-trading fees for non-internalized trades, they submit
orders to maximize their probability of nding a counterparty. In contrast, with high
post-trading fees for non-internalized trades the trade-o¤ tilts towards targeting own
counterparties only which implies a higher surplus in case of execution at the expense
of a lower probability of execution. Under this fee structure, observed liquidity weakly
increases with higher post-trading fees. An increase in the broker industry concentration
also increases observed liquidity.
Furthermore, our ndings also bear regulatory implications. More specically, it is
shown that liquidity can be improved by imposing a fee structure on the CSD. The
liquidity-optimizing fee structure depends on the trading gains level, the marginal costs
for the CSD and the concentration in the broker industry. Moreover, our welfare analysis
highlights an important trade-o¤ for the social planner: a fee structure implying higher
market liquidity may in fact turn out to be detrimental to social welfare. Therefore,
liquidity measures do not necessarily constitute good proxies for welfare. In addition,
initiatives a¤ecting the marginal cost c in our model (such as TARGET2-Securities
(T2S) which aims, among other things, to deliver domestic European-wide settlement
at low cost) could impact the equilibrium played and therefore a¤ect liquidity during
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trading. It is important to recognize and account for this e¤ect when designing legislation
regarding the post-trading phase. Noteworthy, all results are robust to extensions of the
main model (such as market power for the CSD, anonymous trading and di¤erent broker
sizes).
In general, our model deals with traders who endogenously decide to opt for enhanced
trading opportunities by targeting all counterparties but with considerable post-trading
fees, or to opt for the low post-trading fees / low execution probability strategy by ad-
dressing own-broker counterparties only. In fact, this endogenous trade-o¤ between the
probability of matching and post-trading transaction fees extends to many other situa-
tions where transaction fees are important. We consider two closely related examples.
First, consumers willing to trade real estate often employ a real estate broker. The
real estate broker may search only within its existing customer base, implying a lower
matching probability combined with low transaction fees. Alternatively, the real estate
broker may enhance matching opportunities by advertising broadly or contacting other
real estate brokers leading to higher transaction fees. Second, traders may dramatically
increase trading opportunities by making their quotes attractive to cross-border traders.
Cross-border trades typically carry large transaction fees. As an alternative, traders may
aim at local counterparties only leading to low execution probabilities and lower trans-
action fees. In future research it would be interesting to apply our theoretical approach




Proof of Proposition 1.
The equilibrium bid and ask quotes follow immediately from solving the system of
indi¤erence conditions delineated in the main text.
Next, we derive the fee strategy for which the CSD breaks even when it charges a
uniform per-transaction fee, while accounting for the fact that internalized order ow
does not imply costs. Within Proposition 3 we compute the internalization rate under
uniform fees as IRU;all = 1=N . As IRU;all represents the percentage of trades out of
total order ow that is internalized in a given period, its complement stands for the
percentage of non-internalized trades, i.e. 1   IRU;all = (N   1)=N . Clearly, only the
fraction 1   IRU;all induces positive marginal costs for the CSD. As the CSD is active
on both sides of the market in each transaction, it should charge a fee to both legs of











on both legs of every transaction (internalized and non-internalized) on average
breaks even: it gains on transactions for which it does not face marginal costs and
loses on transactions where active clearing and settlement takes place.
Q.e.d.
Proof of Proposition 2.
Solving the systems of indi¤erence equations delineated in the main text, taking
post-trading fees as given, results immediately in the quotes for the sub-equilibria. We
thus only need to prove existence.
Thus, we now investigate under which conditions the di¤erent possible strategies
correspond to a sub-equilibrium. First, the expected limit order payo¤s are computed for
the di¤erent strategies. Next, we will demonstrate under which conditions the di¤erent
sub-equilibria will hold. Two distinct possibilities for a sub-equilibrium arise, which one
is played depends on the level of c. As in the main text, we assume the proportion of
buyers and sellers in the trader population to be equal. This will imply we only have to
analyze the expected payo¤s of one market side as quotes and expected payo¤s of the
other market side are completely symmetric. We rst compute the limit order payo¤s
under the two possible strategies:
 all:


























The expected payo¤ of a buyer linked to any broker submitting BTS;own under this










We now derive under which conditions the di¤erent sub-equilibria apply:
1. Sub-equilibrium allapplies when traders at each broker should have no incentives
to deviate to the ownstrategy This applies when:
TS;all > TS;own, or c <
2N(N   1) (Vh   Vl)
(2N + 1) (2N   1)
2. Sub-equilibrium ownapplies (using similar reasoning) when:
TS;own > TS;all, or c >
2N(N   1) (Vh   Vl)
(2N + 1) (2N   1)
Q.e.d.
Proof of Proposition 3.
The proof is immediate by lling in the stationary probability distribution results of
Appendix B in the denition of trading rate and internalization rate.
Q.e.d.
Proof of Proposition 4.
The proof is immediate by lling in the computed trading rates and internalization
rates (see Proposition 3) in the overall welfare denition.
Q.e.d.
Proof of Proposition 5.
Consider rst the allsub-equilibrium. Traders solve a similar system of indi¤erence
equations as in the proof of Proposition 2 but now account for the monopoly fee instead
of c. For buyers and sellers from each broker j, we respectively have:























Noting that the quotes are the same across all brokers j, and solving the system of
equations results in the equilibrium quotes and spread.
Next, under the ownsub-equilibrium, the proof is identical to the one of Proposi-
tion 2 since all trades are internalized and the CSD receives only these trades.
The proof of existence is identical to the proof of Proposition 2 but we have to use
cm;TS;all instead of c in the derivation.
Finally, it is easy to see that, when the CSD has monopoly power, it will set its fee
as high as possible within the allsub-equilibrium. The highest possible fee such that
traders do not switch to ownstrategies is
cm;TS;all =
2N(N   1) (Vh   Vl)
(2N + 1) (2N   1)
For the computation of the expected per-period prot for the CSD under the all
and ownsub-equilibrium, we refer to the proof of Proposition 6.
Q.e.d.
Proof of Proposition 6.
Under the allsub-equilibrium, expected per-period trader welfare TWm;TS;all is com-
puted in the same way is in Proposition 4, the only di¤erence being that cm;TS;all instead
of c is used. The expected per-period welfare of the CSD is the expected per-period











The expected per-period prot of the CSD is the product of (i) the mark-up cm;TS;all   c
which is charged on each leg of the trade (hence 2 times the mark-up is received per
trade); (ii) the fraction of non-internalized trades N 1
N
; and (iii) the trading rate under
allwhich is 1=3.
Under the own sub-equilibrium, the CSD has zero prots (i.e. CSDWm;TS;own =
0) as all trades are internalized and fees are zero. Expected per-period trader welfare
TWm;TS;own is then identical to the result in our base model and is computed in Proposition
4.
Q.e.d.
Proof of Proposition 7.
With full anonymity, an arriving trader does not know whether a standing limit
order stems from a trader of her own broker or from another broker. Thus, the market





c. Consequently, the indi¤erence
conditions under the all sub-equilibrium (which evidently is the only relevant one
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within this full anonymity setting) for any trader from any broker are:
































Solving these indi¤erence equations leads directly to the quotes and spread in the
proposition.
Next, within the anonymity with agsetting, traders are o¤ered the choice to reveal
their identity. As argued in the main text, the equilibrium played is fully determined
by investors submitting limit orders. First, consider the all strategy. We analyze
whether traders prefer to reveal their identity by comparing the respective payo¤s of
both options. The payo¤s if traders of each broker do not reveal their identity (left-









































Clearly, this always holds as the equilibrium quotes when not revealing (see the rst
part of the proposition) are less liquid than when identities are revealed. Therefore, limit
order traders always deliberately opt not to reveal their identity when they choose the
allstrategy. Second, when is this equilibrium played? Deviating from it is possible by
setting a quote according to the ownstrategy, and simultaneously reveal their identity
using a ag. Limit order traders prefer hiding their identity over revealing as long as the



























which holds as long as c  N(Vh Vl)
2N+1
. In other words, for this range of c payo¤s under
allare larger than under own. Otherwise, the ownstrategy yields the limit order
submitters a greater payo¤.
Q.e.d.
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Appendix B: Innite Markov chain in this model
At any given discrete point in time t, the market can be in three possible states (i.e.
actions): (1) a trader submits a limit order; (2) a trader submits an internalized market
order; (3) a trader submits a non-internalized market order.23 These three states form
a nite state space. For each possible sub-equilibrium s corresponding to fee structure
k, a Markov chain (with the property that the next state depends only on the current
state) could be constructed with transition matrix cMk;s, which is a 3  3 matrix cap-
turing all transitions from one state to another (see Colliard and Foucault (2011) for a
similar approach). These matrices reect the transition probabilities corresponding to
the equilibrium decisions under the considered sub-equilibrium, and could be written as
follows:























From each of these right stochastic transition matrices, in which each row sums to
one and all elements are non-negative, it is possible to derive the stationary probability
distribution over all states. More specically, the stationary distribution 'k;s is a row
vector satisfying 'k;s = 'k;s:cMk;s, i.e. 'k;s is a normalized left eigenvector of cMk;s
associated with the eigenvalue 1. Do note that as this Markov chain is irreducible







the stationary probability of occurrence of states 1, 2 and 3 under the considered sub-







. This distribution 'k;s could be derived for each of the sub-equilibria as:

















and could also be seen as the proportion of time spent in each state within the
considered sub-equilibrium.
23We do not need to make a distinction between buyers and sellers because both sides of the market
are symmetric in our model.
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